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There is an imperative need for a new national com-
mission to review gambling activities throughout the 
United States because few states have prepared com-
prehensive cost/benefit analyses of the social and 
economic impacts of encouraging more licensed gam-
bling activities-particularly casino-style gambling. West 
Virginia, in particular, has not prepared such a report. 
In the national elections held on November 7, 1995, 
over 75 percent of the communities considering casino-
style gambling voted against it. For example, even though 
casino riverboats would have provided some short-term 
economic gains to Floyd and Clark counties in Indiana 
(at the expense of the Louisville economy), both of them 
were good "economic neighbors" and rejected riverboat 
gambling by even greater vote margins than they had 
rejected the riverboats in a previous election. Significantly, 
the voters residing in the state capitol of Missouri, 
Jefferson City, reconsidered the riverboat gambling which 
had been approved previously in 1992, and in the 1995 
election rejected it by a considerable margin (News 
Leader 1995). The Wall Street Journal reported that in 
Louisiana ''the industry has been embroiled in virtual non-
stop scandal ... and its much-t()uted economic payoff, 
especially in terms of job creation, has fallen far short of 
promises" (Wartzman 1995). 
A" of the states surrounding West Virginia have re-
cently considered riverboat casinos and rejected them 
because of the socioeconomic negatives associated with 
casino-style gambling. These types of gambling activi-
ties appear to be disfavored by the public where state 
policymakers and the electorate are given the time and 
the opportunity to examine the costs and benefits of ca-
sino-style gambling. Even so, a national commission is 
needed to analyze the new multifaceted issues involving 
the proliferation of licensed gambling activities. Other-
wise, the public is often relegated to relying on 
i~dustry-generated reports and promotional pieces. 
The last national commission that analyzed gambling 
activities was in 1975-1976 (U.S. Commission 1976). The 
need for new analyses is highlighted by new video tech-
nologies which the industry is promoting to provide 
gambling video terminals in each U.S. household, as well 
as gambling via the Internet Various forms of gambling 
have already been initiated or are proposed for U.S. air-
lines, railroad cars (casinos), blimps, and over 20 casino 
ships (condusting gambling ''trips to nowhere" and includ-
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ing a leased Soviet aircraft carrier for Florida's casino 
gamblers). Once riverboat casinos, in particular, are le-
galized by a state legislature, even greater political 
pressures develop to authorize numerous, unantiCipated 
varieties of gambling. Increasingly, states and communi-
ties are being forced to choose if they wish to be based 
on a gambling economy (like Nevada and Atlantic City) 
or on a nongambling economy (like Hawaii and Tennes-
see). 
The Economic Development Argument Exposed 
From a ~usiness-economic perspective, the main is-
sue involved in legalizing various forms of gambling is 
whether gambling activities constitute a valid strategy for 
economic development. While the dollars invested in 
various legalized gambling projects and the jobs initially 
created are evident, the industry has been criticized for 
inflating the positive economic impacts and trivializing or 
ignoring the negative impacts (Goodman 1994). The 
industry's tendency to focus on specialized factors pro-
vides a distorted view of the localized economic positives, 
while ignoring the strategiC business- economic costs to 
the state as a whole (such as West Virginia) and to differ-
ent regions of the United States (California Governor's 
Office 1992; Kindt 1995). In 1994, a" of the various ex-
perts who testified before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Sma" Business criticized 
the impacts that casino-style gambling activities inflict 
upon the criminal justice system, the social welfare sys-
tem, sma" businesses, and the economy (Congressional 
Hearing 1994). Utilizing legalized gambling activities as 
a strategy for economic development was thoroughly dis-
credited during the hearing. 
Florida is the only state which has conducted a com-
prehensive statewide analysis of the impacts of legalized 
gambling activities. Its report concurred with the con-
gressional hearing's conclusions (Florida Budgeting Office 
1994). 
Since some issue areas have not received widespread 
public attention in West Virginia, this analysiS highlights 
some of the neglected issue areas as they relate to tax 
revenues, social-welfare costs, education, and job cre-
ation. 
Economic Cycles and Gambling's Impact on Tax 
Revenues 
From the perspective of U.S. economic history, the 
United States has had previous econom[c cycles with 
widespread legalized gambling activities. The most rel-
evant cycle occurred after the American Civil War and 
paralleled the post-bellum migration to the "Wild West." 
Although gambling proliferated during this time-frame, 
within a few years the trend toward prohibiting gambling 
activities had begun, and by 1910 there was virtually no 
legal gambling in the United States. Gambling activities 
were not just prohibited via state statutes and local ordi-
nances, but more importantly, these prohibitions were 
incorporated into most state constitutions. The fact that 
state constitutional provisions were utilized to make it as 
difficult as possible for future generations to legalize gam-
bling activities (and thereby experiment once again with 
a classic "boom and bust" economic cycle) lends sub-
stantial credence to arguments that both historically and 
currently, the legalization of gambling activities eventu-
ally causes: (1) increased taxes, (2) a loss of jobs from 
the overall region, (3) economic disruption of other busi-
nesses, (4) increased crime and (5) large social-welfare 
costs for society in general and government agencies in 
particular. For example, two studies of the riverboat ca-
sinos in Illinois concluded that for every one job created 
by the riverboats, most of the surrounding communities 
probably lost one or more jobs from pre-existing busi-
nesses (Grinols 1994; Grinols and Omorov 1995). 
In recent economic history, legalized gambling activi-
ties have been directly and indirectly subsidized by the' 
taxpayers. The field research throughout the nation indi-
cates that for every dollar the legalized gambling interests 
indicate is being contributed in taxes, it usually costs the 
taxpayers at least 3 dollars-and higher numbers have 
been calculated (Politzer, Morrow and Leavey 1981; Bet-
ter Government Association 1992; Florida Budget Office 
1994). These costs to taxpayers are reflected in: (1) 
infrastructure costs, (2) relatively high regulatory costs, 
(3) expenses to the criminal justice system, and (4) large 
social-welfare costs (Illinois Governor's Office 1992). 
Accordingly, several state legislators (e.g., in South Da-
kota) have called for at least partially internalizing these 
external costs by taxing all legalized gambling activities 
at a straight 50 percent tax rate. "-
Furthermore, as a matter of good public policy, state 
officials and legislators in Illinois have proposed legisla-
tion to prohibit contributions by legalized gambling 
interests to politicians and political campaigns. In the 
case of casinos, New Jersey already has such prohibi-
tions, but other states have neglected to enact similar 
prohibitions. Political scientists have raised concerns that 
the newly developing constituencies in the licensed gam-
bling industry are becoming so widespread that the 
industry can dictate economic, social, and tax policies.' 
For example, the industry drafted a state constitutional 
referendum in Florida which would have mandated the 
introduction of casinos into communities-even if a par-
ticular community voted unanimously against a casino 
(Dyckman 1994). The industry spent approximately $3 
million to get the Florida referendum on the ballot and 
$16.5 million to campaign for the casinos-more than the 
combined gubernatorial campaigns of Governor Lawton 
Chiles and his challenger Jeb Bush (Lavelle fu94). In 
these contexts, an article in the Columbia Journalism 
Review cautions the news media to "flat out ask [experts, 
academics, and even other reporters] if they make money 
off the industry" (Simurda 1994). 
Social Welfare Costs 
Legalized gambling activities act as a regressive tax 
on the poor (Clotfelter and Cook 1989). Specifically, the 
legalization of various forms of gambling activities makes 
"poor people poorer" and can dramatically intensify many 
pre-existing social-welfare problems. Demographic analy-
ses reveal that certain disadvantaged socioeconomic 
groups tend to gamble proportionately greater amounts 
of their overall income and marketing efforts, particularly' 
by state lotteries, have allegedly been directed at these 
target groups. 
In a specific example involving casinos, a 1995 Wis-
consin report concluded that "[w]ithout considering the 
social costs of compulsive gambling, the 'rest-of-the-state' 
areas lose-or, transfer in-$223.94 million to the local 
gaming areas. Considering the lowest estimated social 
costs of problem gambling, the rest of ... [Wisconsin] loses 
$318.61 million to gambling" (Thompson, Gazel, and 
Rickman 1995). This report also concluded that without 
casino gambling, many local citizens would have in-
creased participation in other "outside" activities. "More 
than 10% of the locals would spend more on groceries if 
, it were not for the casino, while nearly one-fourth would 
spend more on clothes. Thirty-seven percent said that 
their savings had been reduced since the casino had 
opened ... " (Thompson, Gazel, and Rickman 1995). 
23 
From the business perspective, businesses are not 
naive. For example, "in a rare public stand on a contro-
versial political issue, the Greater Washington Board of 
Trade's 85-member board voted unanimously against" 
Mayor Sharon Pratt 'Kelly'S initiative to bring casino-style 
gambling to Washington, D.C. (emphasis added, Spayd 
and Woodlee 1993). With the exception of the cluster 
services associated with gambling, new businesses tend 
not to locate in areas allowing legalized gambling because 
of one or more of the aforementioned costs. In areas 
saturated with legalized gambling activities, pre-existing 
businesses face added pressures that push them toward 
illiquidity and even bankruptcy. Although South Dakota 
does not constitute a saturated gambling state, this trend 
has already been reported there. South Dakota basi-
cally had no gambling in 1988 and then instituted casino 
gambling and video lottery terminals by the end of 1989. 
Within two years legalized gambling activities constituted 
one of the leading causes of business and personal bank-
ruptcies among South Dakota residents (whereas this 
cause was virtually nonexistent in 1989) (Nelson 1993). 
More subtly, traditional businesses in communities which 
initiate legalized gambling activities can antici-
pate increased personnel costs due to increased job 
absenteeism and declining productivity (Kihdt 1994a). 
The best blue-collar and white-collar workers, the Type-
A personalities, are the most likely to become pathological 
gamblers (Kindt 1994b). A business with 1,000 workers 
can anticipate increased personnel costs of $500,000 or 
more per year-simply by having various forms of legal-
iz~d gambling activities accessible to its workers. 
To some extent. businesses must already internalize 
the societal costs associated with assisting personnel with 
drug or alcohol-related problems. Legalizing various gam-
bling activities increases the number of problems related 
to pathological gambling in the context of the workforce, 
and these costs are reflected in increased personnel 
costs-such as "rehabilitation costs," which can easily 
range from $3,000 to $20,000 (or more) per pathological 
gambler (Kindt 1994b). In the context of the healthcare 
debate, the spectre of these unanticipated costs can raise 
further concerns to businesses already being asked to 
bear certain health care costs. 
Education Costs 
Gambling activities and the gambling philosophy are 
directly opposed to sound business principles and eco-
nomic development. Legalized gambling activities also 
negatively affect education-both philosophically and fis-
cally (Better Government Association 1992; Clotfelter and 
Cook 1989). Adherence to a philosophy of making a liv-
ing via gambling activities not only abrogates the 
perceived need for an education, but also reinforces eco-
nomically unproductive activities (and is statistically 
impossible since the "house" always wins eventually). In 
states with legalized gambling activities which were initi-
ated allegedly to bolster tax revenues to "education," the 
funding in "real dollars" has almost uniformly decreased. 
The Pathological Gambler Problem 
States which embrace legalized gambling activities can 
expect enormous socioeconomic costs and a decline in 
the quality of life. Unlike traditional business activities, 
.legalized gambling activities cater to a market consisting 
of addicted and potentially addicted consumers, and most 
pre-existing traditional bu~inesses will find it quite diffi-
cult to compete for "consumer dollars" which are being 
transformed into "gambling dollars." For example, the 
field research strongly suggests that the introduction of 
widespread legalized gambling in South Dakota, includ-
ing casinos and video lottery terminals (VLTs), over.a 
two-year time span caused a one percent increase in the 
number of problem and probable pathological gamblers-
a recognized addictive behavior pursuant to the American 
Psychiatric Association (Clotfelter and Cook 1989; Bet-
ter Government Association 1992). Each newly-created 
pathological gambler has been calculated to cost SOCiety 
from $13,200 to $52,000 per year (Maryland Department 
of Health 1994; Better Government Association 1994). 
These costs are not just reflected in society as a whole, 
but impact on all businesses. In particular, small busi-
nesses could easily experience disproportionate negative 
impacts, and unlike large corporations, small businesses 
would be less likely to have the asset base necessary to 
cushion against those negative impacts. 
Sociologists almost uniformly report that increased 
gambling activities which are promoted as sociologically 
. "acceptable" (the acceptability factor) and which are made 
"accessible" (the accessibility factor) to larger numbers 
of people will increase the· number of pathological gam-
blers (Goodman 1994; Politzer, Morrow and Leavey 1981; 
Better Government Association 1992; Maryland Depart-
ment of Health 1994). The baseline of pathological 
gamblers as part of the population begins at .77 percent 
as reported by the 1976 U.S. Commission on Gambling 
(U.S. Commission 1976). Since gambling has been le-
galized af\d made accessible in several states, the range 
has increased to 1.5 to 5 percent in those states (Alberta 
Lotteries and Gambling 1994). This phenomenon was 
specifically confirmed by a 1995 study which concluded 
that the lifetime probable pathological and problem gam-
blers in Iowa increased from 1.7 percent of the public in 
1989 tb 5.4 percent in 1995 (Iowa Department of Human 
Services 1995; Petroski 1995). Similarly, a limited study 
of Native Americans revealed a rate for lifetime probable 
pathological and problem gamblers of 14.5 percent in 
casino areas (Alberta Lotteries and Gambling 1994). 
These developments translate into increases in socio-
economic costs which must be addressed and absorbed 
primarily by taxpayers, but also by businesses, charities, 
social-welfare organizations and governmental units. 
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Negative Impact on Job Creation 
On a regional level, the combined ranges of these vari-
ous socioeconomic costs are so large that they tend to 
dwarf the localized economic positives (California 
Governor's Office 1992). These drains on society could 
easily translate into a net loss of jobs on a statewide or 
regional level. Furthermore, it can be argued that the 
combined economic positives and negatives result in a 
net negative economic multiplier (Goodman 1994; Teske 
and Sur 1991). From the perspective of business-eco-
nomics and strategic development, major businesses are 
and should be concerned with the trend toward expand-
ing various forms of legalized gambling activities. Among 
other reasons, nongambling related businesses will not 
be competing for consumer dollars or recreational dol-
lars on a "level playing field," because legalized gambling 
activities can cater to an addicted and potentially addicted 
market segment. 
Since the U.S. economy and most state economies 
are extensive in scope, the socioeconomic negatives 
associated with legalized gambling activities can remain 
hidden for long periods of time. However,·just because a 
particular activity is "legalized" by a state government does 
not mean that the negative business or societal impacts 
have been eliminated-or even reduced. 
Conclusion 
Increasingly, taxpayers and businesses are beginning 
to realize that, as Professor Jack Van Der Slik has sum-
marized for much of the academic community, 
state-sponsored gambling "produces no product, no new 
wealth, and so it makes no genuine contribution to eco-
nomic development" (Van Der Slik 1990). Business-
economic history supports this proposition. The 
recriminalization of gambling activities occurred 100 years 
ago after a brief gambling boom following the Civil War. 
Most state legislatures utilized constitutional provisions 
to recriminalize gambling, because lawmakers wanted 
to make it as difficult as possible for future generations to 
experiment with the classic "boom and bust" cycles and 
the concomitant socioeconomic negatives occasioned by 
legalized gambling activities. To paraphrase Georg 
Hegel's common quote, "those who forget the lessons of 
economic history are condemned to relive them" (Bartlett 
1968). 
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